



LEVEL 3 SECURITY POLICY FOR ProtectServer Gold (PSG)

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the ProtectServer Gold (PSG). This security policy describes how the PSG meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to operate the PSG in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as a part of the Level 3 FIPS 140-2 validation of the PSG.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST web site at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>.

1.2 References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the PSG in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the PSG and other SafeNet products from the following sources:

- The SafeNet internet site contains information on the full line of security products at <http://www.safenet-inc.com/products/pki/index.asp>.
- For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the SafeNet internet site at <http://www.safenet-inc.com/company/contact.asp>.

1.3 Terminology

In this document the SafeNet ProtectServer Gold card is referred to as the PSG, the adapter, or the module.

1.4 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 submission package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Vendor Evidence document (CR-2792)
- Finite State Machine (CR-2678)
- Module Software Listing
- Functional Specification (CR-2848 / 008329-001)
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

This document provides an overview of the PSG and explains the secure configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the PSG. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.

This Security Policy and other Certification Submission Documentation were produced by SafeNet. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation is proprietary to SafeNet.



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2. THE PSG CARD

2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification

The SafeNet PSG is a high-end intelligent PCI adapter card that provides a wide range of cryptographic functions using firmware and dedicated hardware processors. This document refers specifically to PSG hardware revision B4 running firmware version 2.07.00.




Figure 2-1. The PSG

The module, running SafeNet's Cprov firmware, implements the Cryptoki cryptographic API as defined by RSA Data Security. While certain Cryptoki features are not supported, the module does provide a comprehensive compliance to the PKCS#11 standard as well as vendor-specific extensions.

The cryptographic boundary for this module encapsulates the majority of the adapter card. An opaque, metal cover surrounds the card to provide tamper-protection and to establish the cryptographic boundary. This boundary encapsulates the Data Ciphering Processor (DCP), embedded processor, SDRAM memory chips, and the Real Time Clock (RTC).

The module provides key management (e.g., generation, storage, deletion, and backup), an extensive suite of cryptographic mechanisms, and process management including separation between operators. The *PSG* also features non-volatile tamper protected memory for key storage, a hardware random number generator, and an RTC.



The *PSG* is classified as a multi-chip embedded processor for FIPS 140-2 purposes. The FIPS 140-2 cryptographic boundary is defined by the perimeter of the protection covers. The battery, battery isolation link, and external alarm input link are excluded from the FIPS 140-2 security requirements.

The *PSG* meets all level 3 requirements for FIPS 140-2 as summarized in Table 2-1.

Section	Section title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	3
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	3
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
4	Finite State Machine	3
5	Physical Security	3
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key Management	3
8	EMI/EMC	3
9	Self Tests	3
10	Design Assurance	3
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Table 2-1. FIPS 140-2 Security Levels

2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

The *PSG* has the following physical interfaces:

- A standard PCI bus interfacing to the motherboard of the host machine
- Two asynchronous RS232 serial connectors
- A battery isolation connector
- An external alarm input connector.

The *PSG* provides a tightly secured cryptographic element. All requests for services sent to the adapter over the PCI bus or the serial ports are captured by the adapter's processor, which controls the level of access to the on-board cryptographic services and the keys. The adapter's processor also responds to PKCS #11 commands, ensuring that during FIPS operation only authenticated users receive cryptographic services.

The module's physical interfaces are separated into the logical interfaces, defined by FIPS 140-2, and described in Table 2-2:

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces	Adapter Physical Interfaces
Data Input Interface	PCI Bus, Serial ports
Data Output Interface	PCI Bus, Serial ports
Control Input Interface	PCI Bus, External tamper input
Status Output Interface	PCI Bus
Power Interface	PCI Bus, External battery link

Table 2-2. FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces



2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication

The *PSG* supports identity-based authentication of its operator. Operators are identified by a token name and PIN. The different roles and required authentication are shown in Table 2-3.

Role	Type of authentication	Authentication Data
Admin SO	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN
Administrator	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN
Token SO	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN
Token User	Identity Based	Operator Unique PIN

Table 2-3. Roles and Required Identification and Authentication

The *PSG* supports three types of Tokens: one Administration Token, multiple Cprov Tokens and one or more Smart Card Tokens. All Tokens have two operators: a Security Officer (SO) and a User. For the Administration Token, the Admin SO is the Security Officer and the Administrator is the User. For all other Tokens, the Security Officer is the Token SO and the Token User is the User.

The operator explicitly selects a role when logging in by selecting a PKCS#11 Token and nominating either User or SO Role. The adapter provides restricted services to an operator based on the role to which the operator authenticated. There is only one operator assigned to each role. The Admin SO, Admin and Token SO perform FIPS 140-2 Crypto Officer roles while the Token User performs a FIPS 140-2 User role.

The *PSG* enforces an absolute minimum PIN length of 4 characters. The module allows the PIN character to be any value but the software typically used with the module restricts the dictionary to the ANSI C character set. This character set provides for 92 visible characters which, with a 4 character PIN, provides a probability of less than one in 1,000,000 that a random PIN attempt (e.g., guess) will succeed (actual probability is approximately 1/71,600,000). The module is protected from brute force PIN attacks by imposing an increasing delay for every failed PIN attempt after the first three failed attempts. The initial delay is 5 seconds and increases by an additional 5 seconds for each subsequent failed attempt, e.g., 3 fails causes a 5 second delay; 4 fails causes a 10 second delay; 5 fails causes a 15 second delay; etc.

2.3.1 Services for Authorized Roles

Table 2-4 lists the services related to each authorized role within the adapter:

Role	Services
Admin SO	Initialize Administrator Token User PIN
Admin	Manage Adapter and Admin Token
Token SO	Manage Token
Token User	Use Token and manage token keys
Unauthenticated operator	Unauthenticated services

Table 2-4. Available Services



2.3.2 Administrator Security Officer

The primary role of the Administrator Security Officer (ASO) is to introduce the Administrator to the system. The ASO is able to set the initial Administrator PIN value but is not able to change the administration PIN after it is initialized. The ASO can perform the following actions:

- Set the initial Administrator PIN value (may not change it later).
- Set the CKA_TRUSTED attribute on a Public object in the Admin Token.
- Set the CKA_EXPORT attribute on a Public object in the Admin Token.
- Manage Host Interface Master Keys
- Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects
- Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive¹ Public objects
- May change his/her own PIN
- Read the Hardware Event Log
- May modify Monotonic Counter object

2.3.3 Administrator

The Administrator is responsible for the overall security management of the adapter. Token Security Officers and Slots are controlled by the Administrator. The following actions are available to the Administrator:

- Set or Change RTC value
- Read the Hardware Event Log
- Purge a full Hardware Event Log
- Configure the Transport Mode feature
- Specify the Security Policy of the adapter
- Create new Cprov Slots/Tokens and specify their Labels, SO PINs, and minimum PIN Length
- Initialize smart cards and specify their Labels and SO PINs
- Destroy individual Cprov Slots/Tokens
- Erase all adapter Secure Memory including all PINs and User Keys
- Perform Firmware Upgrade Operation
- Manage Host Interface Master Keys
- Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects on Admin Token
- Exercise cryptographic services with Private objects on Admin Token
- Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Public objects on Admin Token
- Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Private objects on Admin Token
- May change his/her own PIN
- May revoke Authentication

¹ Key Derive operations are listed in Table 2-10.

2.3.4 Token SO

The Token SO is responsible for granting and revoking ownership of the token. If the Token does not have a User PIN, the Token SO should initialize it by assigning the Label and User PIN. The token SO may also revoke the Token User's privileges (and possibly reassign the token to another operator) but only by destroying all the key material of the original operator first. The following actions are available to the Token SO:

- Set the initial User PIN value (may not change it later)
- Reset (re-initialize) the Token (destroys all keys and User PIN on the Token) and set a new Label
- Set the CKA_TRUSTED attribute on a Public object in his or her Token
- Set the CKA_EXPORT attribute on a Public object in his or her Token
- Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects in his or her Token
- Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Public objects in his or her Token
- May change his/her own PIN
- May modify Monotonic Counter object

2.3.5 Token User

Token users may manage and use private and public keys on their own tokens. The following actions are available to the Token User:

- Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects in his or her Token
- Exercise cryptographic services with Private objects in his or her Token
- Create, destroy, import, export, generate, derive Public objects in his or her Token
- Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Private objects in his or her Token
- May change his/her own PIN

2.3.6 Unauthenticated Operators

Certain services are available to operators who have not (yet) authenticated to the adapter:

- Exercise status querying services
- Authenticate to a Token
- Force session terminate, restart adapter by setting the doorbell register on the hardware. The doorbell register is a memory map to the PCI bus. The host application can force a restart by writing a certain value to the register through the PSG device driver. The transparent PCI chip will then generate a bus cycle restart which in turn will restart the adapter.

All of the services available to the Unauthenticated Operators are also available to all authenticated operators.



2.4 Physical Security

The adapter provides tamper evidence and tamper response mechanisms. The non-removable metal casing provides a strong tamper evident enclosure. The Administrator should perform routine visual inspection of the module for evidence of tamper such as scratches.

The module is actively protected through a combination of tamper switches, a light sensor, and a voltage monitor. The *PSG* protection can also be activated by removal of the adapter from the host machine or via an external alarm input capability. In the event of a tamper the *PSG* enters a Tamper state in which all processing is halted and the secure memory is erased.

2.5 Operational Environment

This section does not apply. The *PSG* does not provide a modifiable operational environment.

2.6 Cryptographic Key Management

The *PSG* is a general-purpose cryptographic management device and thus securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters (CSPs) such as passwords.

2.6.1 Key Generation

The *PSG* Module supports the generation of DSA, RSA, ECDSA (also known as ECC), and DH public and private keys. The module also supports the generation of two- and three-key Triple-DES keys as well as AES 128 bit, 192 bit, and 256 bit keys. The module implements the FIPS approved PRNG specified in FIPS 186-2 x-Original using SHA-1 that is used for generating random values required for key generation. The PRNG is seeded from the HRNG from the Pijnenburg crypto chip.

2.6.2 Key Access / Storage

All keys except module specific keys are stored as plaintext token objects in secure memory (battery-backed RAM), and the module prevents physical access to this RAM through the physical security mechanisms discussed in section 2.4. Logical access to keys and other CSPs is restricted to authenticated operators with valid permissions. Any key input to the module is done so over a TDES encrypted trusted channel, or by components through a dedicated port and the module only allows keys to be output if they are wrapped using a FIPS approved algorithm.

The following table outlines all the keys stored by the module.



Security Relevant Data Item	SRDI Input	SRDI Output	SRDI Description
Firmware Upgrade Certificate	Plaintext	None	An X.509 certificate containing a 2048-bit RSA public key embedded within the module's firmware image (in Flash memory). This key is used to verify the signature attached to a new firmware image.
Default Administrative Token SO PIN	Plaintext	N/A	Default SO PIN used for the Administrative Token. This PIN is generally modified as the first step in initialising the module. This default PIN is stored in the module's firmware image.
Diffie-Hellman parameters	Internally Generated	N/A	Used to establish an encrypted channel between an operator and the module. These parameters are stored in the module's secure memory.
Operating PINs	Encrypted	Encrypted	All users' PINs – Admin Token SO, Admin Token User, Token SOs, and Token users. All PINs are stored in the module's secure memory.
Token Keys	Encrypted or Split Knowledge	Encrypted or Split Knowledge	All user created keys for use by user applications. These keys are stored in the module's secure memory.
PRNG Seed Key	N/A	N/A	A new FIPS 186-2 PRNG Seed Key is generated for every block of 160 bits created by the PRNG algorithm. The key is held in dynamic memory and is lost when power is removed or the module is tampered.

Table 2-5. List of Keys Stored in Module

The following table outlines the access that “Authorized Services” (see Table 2-4), have to the keys listed in Table 2-5. Here ‘R’ stands for “Read”, ‘W’ stands for “Write”, X stands for “Execute” and “Z” stands for “Zeroize”.

	FW Upgrade Cert	Default Admin Token SO PIN	DH Parameters	Operating PINs	Token Keys (Public)	Token Keys (Private)	PRNG Seed Key
Initialization	-	-	X	WX	-	-	-
Administrator SO	WX	WX	WXZ	WXZ	RWXZ	WRXZ	-
Administrator	-	-	X	WXZ	-	-	-
Token SO	-	-	X	X	-	-	-
Token User	-	-	X	X	XZ	XZ	XW
Unauthenticated Operators	-	-	-	X	-	-	-

Table 2-6. Access to Keys for Authorized Services



Please note that the FW Upgrade Cert is never zeroized because it is a public key. The Default Admin Token SO PIN is never zeroized because it's a pre-initialization value. The PRNG Seed Key is zeroized when a tamper event is detected or overwritten when the module is restarted. All other CSPs/Keys identified in Table 2-6 are zeroized by a call to C_DestroyObject() API by the respective role or through a tamper event.

2.6.3 Security Functions

The PSG supports a wide variety of security functions. FIPS 140-2 requires that only FIPS Approved algorithms be used whenever there is an applicable FIPS standard.

Table 2-7 lists the PSG approved security functions. In the FIPS mode of operation only these Approved security functions are available.

Approved Security Function
AES (cert. #921)
DSA (Cert. #329)
ECDSA (Cert. #114) – Only NIST Recommended Curves
RSA (Cert. #448)
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (Cert. #908)
HMAC: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (Cert. #515)
TDES (Cert. #741)
TDES MAC (Vendor Affirmed; Cert. #741)
RNG (Cert. #529)

Table 2-7. Approved Security Functions

Table 2-8 lists the PSG Non-Approved security functions, but FIPS allowed. In the FIPS mode of operation these Non-Approved security functions are available.

Non-Approved FIPS allowed Security Functions
DH ²
RSA ENCRYPT / DECRYPT ³
ECDH ⁴ - Only NIST Recommended Curves

Table 2-8. Non-Approved FIPS Allowed Security Functions

Table 2-9 lists the PSG Non-Approved security functions. When the PSG is in the FIPS mode of operation these functions are not available.

² Key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 152 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 80-bits of encryption strength

³ Key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 152 bits of encryption strength

⁴ Key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 256 bits of encryption strength



Non-Approved Security Functions
<i>DES (ECB, CBC, OFB64)</i>
<i>DES MAC</i>
<i>AES MAC</i>
<i>CAST 128 (ECB, CBC)</i>
<i>CAST MAC</i>
<i>IDEA (ECB, CBC)</i>
<i>IDEA MAC</i>
<i>RC2 (ECB, CBC)</i>
<i>RC2 MAC</i>
<i>SEED (ECB, CBC)</i>
<i>SEED MAC</i>
<i>MD2</i>
<i>MD5</i>
<i>MD5 HMAC</i>
<i>RC4 (ECB)</i>
<i>RIPEMD-128</i>
<i>RIPEMD-160</i>
<i>RMD128 HMAC</i>
<i>RMD160 HMAC</i>
<i>ECIES</i>

Table 2-9. Non-Approved Security Functions

MECHANISMS FOR SPLIT KNOWLEDGE ENTRY/OUTPUT OF KEY (Allowed in FIPS Mode)	ENCODING AND DECODING OF KEY/CERTIFICATE FORMATS (Allowed in FIPS Mode)	DISABLED/NON-ALLOWED DERIVATION METHODS (Not Allowed in FIPS Mode)
CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_KEY CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY CKM_SECRET_SHARE_WITH_ATTRIBUTES	CKM_DECODE_PKCS_7 CKM_DECODE_X_509 CKM_ENCODE_PKCS_10 CKM_ENCODE_X_509_LOCAL_CERT CKM_ENCODE_X_509	CKM_DES3_DERIVE_CBC_DERIVE CKM_DES3_DERIVE_ECB CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE CKM_SHAxxx_KEY_DERIVATION CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY

Table 2-10 Summary of Key Derive Mechanisms

2.7 Self-Tests

The *PSG* Module performs a number of power-up and conditional self-tests to ensure proper operation.



2.7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests

When the module is initially powered-on, it executes a battery of power-up self-tests. If any of the power-up self-tests fail, the module will enter an error state and prohibit an operator from exercising the module's cryptographic functionality. Table 2-11 lists the power-up self-tests:

Test	Function	FIPS 140-2 Required
SDRAM	Tests the module's volatile working memory by performing a connectivity test	No
SRAM	Tests the module's static RAM by performing a connectivity test	No
Secure Memory File System Integrity	Initializes and checks the module's secure memory file system	Yes
Flash Boot Block	Verifies a checksum over the module's personalization data in ROM	No
RTC Connectivity	Verifies that the CPU can connect to the UART device	No
PRNG FIPS G	Verifies the PSG implementation of the FIPS G SHA-1 function	Yes
Symmetric Cipher KATs	Performs known answer tests for AES, TDES, CAST, IDEA, RC2, DES, and RC4.	AES and TDES
MAC and HMAC KATs	Performs known answer tests for CAST MAC, IDEA MAC, RC2 MAC, DES MAC and TDES MAC. Performs known answer tests for MD5 HMAC, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, RMD128 HMAC and RMD160 HMAC.	TDES MAC HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
Asymmetric Cipher KATs	Performs known answer tests for RSA operations.	Yes
Asymmetric Key Derive KATs	Performs known answer tests for ECDH1 Derive	No
Asymmetric Pairwise Consistency Test	Performs a pairwise consistency test on a DH key pair	No
Sign/Verify	Known Answer signature/verification tests for RSA, DSA and ECDSA.	RSA, DSA, ECDSA
Message Digest KATs	Verifies known message/hash pairs for MD2, MD5, RMD128, RMD 160, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512.	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Software/Firmware Integrity	Ensures that the software/firmware on the module has not been modified / damaged by calculating a SHA-1 hash over all software/firmware components and comparing the digest to a known good result.	Yes
Statistical RNG	Performs a Statistical Chi Square test of 2500 bytes of random data	(Legacy)

Table 2-11. Power-up Self-Tests

2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module performs conditional self-tests as outlined in Table 2-12.



Test	Function	FIPS 140-2 Required
Pairwise Consistency	Runs a pairwise consistency check each time the module generates a DSA, RSA, ECC, or DH public/private key pair.	DSA, RSA, ECC
Continuous HW RNG	Performs the FIPS 140-2 required continuous RNG check each time the module's Hardware RNG is used to produce random data.	Yes
Continuous PRNG	Performs the FIPS 140-2 required continuous RNG check each time the module's PRNG is used to produce random data.	Yes
Software Load	Checks that software is digitally signed before it can be loaded. Note: Following a successful verification, all keys and CSPs will be zeroized. After the zeroization, the PSG will automatically transition to a non-FIPS mode and will require reconfiguration to return to FIPS mode. .	Yes

Table 2-12. Conditional Self-Tests

2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The PSG does not employ any technology specifically intended to mitigate against other attacks.

3. FIPS APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION

3.1 Description

The PSG allows its administrators the choice of employing a wide range of security technologies. To comply with FIPS mode of operation the PSG must be configured in a secure manner. This includes:

- Operation with only FIPS approved algorithms as listed in Table 2-9;
- Not permitting the export of clear keys;
- Locking the security mode to prevent circumvention of the mode setting;
- Not permitting PINs to be used in clear;
- Not permitting changes to the PSG firmware without first clearing all protected keys and CSPs; and
- Providing authentication and session management security.

This Security Policy describes a particular PSG firmware and hardware. The PSG firmware can be replaced (with a firmware upgrade operation) or extended (by loading Functionality Modules [FMs]). The operator should ensure that the firmware and hardware of the PSG are validated configurations.

The PSG checks that new firmware is digitally signed before it can be loaded. Following a successful verification all keys and CSPs will be zeroized. After the zeroization, the PSG will automatically transition to a non-FIPS mode and will require reconfiguration to return to FIPS mode.



3.2 Invoking Approved Mode of Operation

An operator may easily place the PSG in “FIPS mode” by simply running the administrative `CTCONF -fF` command from the remote management facility. Once this command is executed the PSG will reject all requests for non-FIPS algorithms or configurations. Please note that the operator has to be logged in as an Administrator to invoke the FIPS mode of operation.

3.3 Mode of Operation Indicator

Running the display status command from a remote management facility will return a status displaying the current PSG operating mode.

3.4 Invoking Mode of Operation Indicator

An operator may easily view the current PSG mode of operation by simply running the administrative `CTCONF -v` command from the remote management facility. Once this command is executed the PSG will respond with full details of the adapter configuration. The configuration details include details of the firmware loaded and a listing of the adapter security mode flags one of which indicates that the module is in the FIPS mode of operation.

4. DESIGN ASSURANCE

4.1 Distribution and Delivery of Module

The module is shipped in an anti-static shipping envelope that is sealed with a SafeNet security sticker and placed inside a SafeNet shipping box. The user should inspect the product shipping boxes to make sure they have not been tampered with or damaged upon receiving the modules, which could indicate a security compromise.



APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Programming Interface
ATSO	Administrative Token Security Operator
ATU	Administrative Token User
CA	Certificate Authority
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HRNG	Hardware Random Number Generator
IDEA	International Data Encryption Algorithm
KAT	Known Answer Test
LCD	Liquid Crystal Display
LED	Light Emitting Diode
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD2	Message Digest Algorithm 2
MD5	Message Digest Algorithm 5
MD5 HMAC	MD5 Hashed Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NO	Normal Operator
PSG	ProtectServer Gold
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator
RAM	Random Access Memory
RC2	Rivest's Code 2
RC4	Rivest's Code 4
RNG	Random Number Generator
RoHS	Restriction on Hazardous Substances
ROM	Read Only Memory
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
RWXZ	Read, Write, Execute, Zero



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Acronym	Definition
SDRAM	Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
SHA1	Secure Hash Algorithm
SO	Security Operator
SRAM	Static Random Access Memory
TDES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
USB	Universal Serial Bus
USO	User Security Operator
VGA	Video Graphics Array



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